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Burket v. Angelone
208 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2000)
L Facts
On the afternoon of January 14,1993, the bodies of Katherine Tafelski
("Katherine") and her daughter Ashley Tafelski (Ashley") were found in
Katherine's house. In addition, Katherine's son Andrew Tafelski ("An-
drew") and a family friend, Chelsea Brothers ("Chelsea"), were found alive
inside the house. They too had been assaulted. The police search of the
room where Katherine's body was found uncovered a blue washcloth that
contained spermatozoa. Tool marks consistent with marks on the bodies
of the victims were found on the back door. In the backyard a foot print
was discovered.'
Several times during the police investigation of the crime scene, a man
later identified as Russel Burket ("Burket"), was observed on the porch of
a neighboring house. On one occasion Burket began to walk toward the
officers investigating the scene and was told to return to his home. A
detective interviewed Burket later that day. Burket told the detective that
he often performed odd jobs at the Tafelski house and that he was outside
of his residence around midnight on the night of the murders but had not
seen anything unusual.2 From tests later performed on the spermatozoa
samples from the blue washcloth, it was determined that Burket's DNA was
consistent with the samples.' On January 20, 1993, Burket accompanied
detectives to police headquarters. Burket was advised that he was not under
arrest and was free to leave at any time. Burket's interview was both audio
and video taped. Burket ultimately gave detectives a detailed confession to
the murders of Katherine and Ashley and the assaults on Andrew and
Chelsea."
1. Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 177-79 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2761
(2000). The tool was subsequently identified as a 'rusty metal prybar" or an automotive tool.
The footprint in the backyard was later determined to belong to the defendant. Id. at 179.
2. Id. at 179.
3. Id. Approximately 7.8% of the Caucasian population possess the same HLA Dqa
type as that identified from the washcloth sample. Id.
4. Id. at 195-98. During the interview, Burket was falsely informed that the police had
at that time physical evidence connecting him to the scene and that the children had seen
Burket inside t Tafelski house on the night of the murders. Twice during the interview and
prior to Burket's confession, Burket indicated that he would need a lawyer. Id. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found these statements to be equivocal and
not exercises of Burket's right to counsel. Id.
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
On July 6, 1993, Burket was indicted on charges of malicious wound-
ing, statutory burglary, inanimate object sexual penetration, and capital
murder.' The capital count was based on the willful and premeditated
murders of Katherine and Ashley as part of the same act or transaction.
On January 19, 1994, Burket pleaded guilty to capital murder, but reserved
the right to appeal the admissibility of his taped confession The trial court
found the presence of both aggravating factors, future dangerousness and
vileness, and sentenced Burket to death.'
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Burket's
convictions and sentences.9 The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari on April 3, 1995.10 On August 30, 1995, Burket filed his state
habeas petition in the Supreme Court of Virginia." On July 19, 1996,
Burket filed an amended state habeas petition alleging the following: (1) trial
counsel operated under several conflicts of interest; (2) trial counsel abdi-
cated his role to investigate, prepare, and defend Burket; (3) Burket's guilty
pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; (4) the trial
court failed to inquire about Burket's competency and to conduct a compe-
tency hearing; (5) Burket was incompetent during all critical stages of the
trial; (6) the trial court's refusal to suppress Burket's confession violated his
rights under Miranda; (7) Burket was deprived of effective assistance of
counsel; (8) trial counsel unreasonably utilized mental health experts; (9)
Burket was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of competent
mental health experts; and (10) the Commonwealth engaged in various
5. Id. at 179-80.
6. Id. at 180; see VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(7) (Michie 1996).
7. Burket, 208 F.3d at 180.
8. Id.
9. Burket v. Commonwealth, 450 S;E.2d 124 (Va. 1994). On direct appeal, Burket
raised the following claims: (1) his confession was inadmissable under Miranda v. Arizona; (2)
his right to counsel was violated; (3) his rights under Miranda were violated when police
continued to question him after he had been advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the state trial
court erred in finding Burket's waiver of Miranda was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent;
(5) Burket's rights under Miranda were violated when police continued to question him after
his statements indicating he did not want to continue the interview; (6) the imposition of the
death penalty violates the Cruel and Unusual Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (7) his right to a jury trial was denied because
he could not tell the jury how much time he would serve if given a life sentence; (8) the trial
court erred in finding the Commonwealth's expert more credible than the defendant's expert
witness; (9) the trial court failed to properly consider his mitigating evidence; (10) the trial
court erred in not allowing Katherine's husband to testify at the penalty phase of the trial.
Id.; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-80 (1966).
10. Burket v. Virginia, 514 U.S. 1053 (1995).
11. Burket, 208 F.3d at 180. Appointed counsel for the state habeas proceedings became
seriously ill in November 1995. Burket then filed a motion requesting appointed counsel




forms of misconduct, including the manner in which Burket's confession
was obtained and the Commonwealth's introduction of expert testimony
regarding Burket's future dangerousness.12
On August 26, 1996, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the
amended state habeas petition." Burket's reply to the Commonwealth's
motion to dismiss was filed on September 30, 1996.14 Two affidavits accom-
panied the reply. The first affidavit was unexecuted, but was prepared for
Burket's father, Lester Burket, Jr. The second affidavit was executed by
Susan Brown, a paralegal in the Virginia Capital Representation Resource
Center. Brown stated in her affidavit that Burket's father had relayed to
her the information contained in the unexecuted affidavit, but he did not
want to sign the affidavit because it contained information that upset his
wife and he thought it would hurt his son Lester Burket, M. " On Novem-
ber 20, 1996, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Burket's amended
state habeas petition.16
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Burket asserted all claims from
his amended state habeas petition and requested an evidentiary hearing.
After counsel filed Burket's petition for federal habeas relief, Burket filed
pro se motions to abandon further review of his death sentence and to
schedule his execution. The district court denied his motions to withdraw
the federal habeas petition and directed a United States Magistrate Judge to
consider the petition and issue a report and recommendation."7 The Magis-
trate Judge recommended that Burket's request for an evidentiary hearing
be deniecand that his petition for habeas corpus be dismissed.'8 The district




16. Id. at 182. The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed claims (1), (2), and (3) under
the authority ofAnderon v. Warden. See Anderson v. Warden, 281 S.E.2d 885, 888 (Va. 1981)
(holding that petitioner on state habeas may not call into question the truthfulness of
petitioner's statements made during trial regarding the adequacy of counsel and the voluntari-
ness of guilty pleas without a valid reason). With respect to claims (3) through (6), (9), and
(10), the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed the claims under the authority of Slayton v.
Parrigan. See Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974) (holding that claims that
could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal but were not, are not cognizable on state
habeas). Portions of claims (6) and (10) challenging the voluntariness of Burket's confession
were dismissed under the authority of Hawks v. Cox. See Hawks v. Cox, 175 S.E.2d 271,274
(Va. 1970) (holding that claims decided against the petitioner on direct appeal are not
cognizable on state habeas). Claims (7) and (8) were found to lack merit. Burket's motion
for an evidentiary hearing was denied. The Commonwealth's motion to strike Burket's
affidavits was granted. Burket, 208 F.3d at 181-82.




court accordingly denied the request and dismissed the petition.19 Burket
moved to set aside, or in the alternative to alter, the district court's judg-
ment. The district court denied the request and Burket noted a timely
appeal. On August 25, 1999, Burket filed a certificate of appealability to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On petition for a
certificate of appealability, Burket renewed the claims made in his amended
state habeas petition.2"
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit held the following: (1) Virginia's Anderson rule
would not be applied to establish procedural default; (2) Burket failed to
establish a conflct of interest rendering trial counsel's performance ineffec-
tive; (3) Burket failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in the
context of his guilty pleas; (4) counsel's decision not to raise competency
claims on appeal was not ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) no Miranda
warnings were required when Burket stated "I'm gonna need a lawyer;" (6)
police were not required to cease interroation after Burket's statement; (7)
Burket impliedly waived his Miranda rights; and (8) certain of Burket's
statements did not constitute unequivocal requests to remain silent.2 ' The
application for a certificate of appealability was denied and the appeal wasdismssed."2
IlL Analysis Application in Virginia
A. The Anderson Rule as an Adequate and Independent State Ground for
Purposes of Procedural Default
Anderson v. Warden' held that a petitioner is not permitted to chal-
lenge on state habeas the truth and accuracy of representations made by him
as to the adequacy of counsel or the voluntariness of petitioner's plea unless
petitioner offers a valid reason why he should be permitted to controvert
his earlier statements.24 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Burket's
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the holding in Ander-
son." Under the rules of procedural default, a federal court cannot question
a state court's application of a state procedural rule because a state court's
19. Id. at 182-83.
20. Id. at 183.
21. Id. at 195. Burket's claims related to counsel's failure to raise competency claims
on appeal were held to be procedurally barred. Id. The admission of Burket's confession was
not found to be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
Burket's cl2m of violations of Miranda and its progeny were rejected on similar grounds.
Id. at 197.
22. Id. at 201.
23. 281 S.E.2d 885 (Va. 1981).
24. Anderson v. Warden, 281 S.E.2d 885, 888 (Va. 1981); see Burket, 208 F.3d at 188.
25. Burket, 208 F.3d at 188.
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finding of procedural default is not reviewable if it is based on an adequate
and independent state ground.26 A rule is "adequate" if it is regularly and
consistently applied by the state courts." A rule is "independent" if it does
not depend on a federal constitutional ruling.28 In Royal v. Taylor,2 9 the
Fourth Circuit found the Anderson rule not to be an independent and
adequate state ground for procedural default.30 The court in Royal declined
to apply Anderson because the application of Anderson by the Supreme
Court of Virginia was found to be inconsistent."1 Based on Royal, the
Fourth Circuit declined to consider Anderson an adequate and independent
state ground for procedural default of Burket's claims.32
B. The Strickland Test as Applied to Claims of Conflict of Interest
Because the Fourth Circuit declined to apply Anderson, the court
reached the merits of Burket's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
33
Burket's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was based on a claim that
trial counsel operated under a conflict of interest.' Claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel are analyzed under the two-part test set forth in
Strickland v. Washington.35  To satisfy the Strickland test, the petitioner
must establish that trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable
and that the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's unreasonable perfor-
mance. 6 The performance prong is proved when trial counsel's acts fall
outside the realm of objectively reasonable performance.' The court does
not second-guess counsel's trial strategy, but analyzes counsel's actions with
great deference. 8 The prejudice prong is satisfied when it can be established
that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result at trial would have
been different. 9 When a petitioner claims that trial counsel labored under
a conflict of interest, the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel
26. Id. at 183 (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989)).
27. Id. (citing Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988)).
28. Id. (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)).
29. 188 F.3d 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 165 (1999).
30. Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 248 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 165 (1999).
31. Id.
32. Burket, 208 F.3d at 184.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
36. Id. at 687-88.
37. Id. at 687; see Burket, 208 F.3d at 183.
38. Burket, 208 F.3d at 183.
39. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
2000]
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is different.' The performance prong is proved when petitioner has estab-
lished that counsel was involved in an actual conflict of interest.4' Prejudice
to the petitioner is presumed once petitioner has established that a conflict
of interest in fact exists."
The Fourth Circuit found that Burket's trial counsel did not operate
under a conflict of interest.' Burket's claim rested primarily on the two
affidavits stricken by the Supreme Court of Virginia in the state habeas
petition." The first affidavit was never executed by the affiant. 5 The
second affidavit was clearly hearsay.4' The Fourth Circuit found that the
affidavits were not admissible, and found no error in the Supreme Court of
Virginia's striking of the affidavits." The affidavits were not considered in
the court's analysis of Burket's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
With only the evidentiary record from the pre-trial investigation and the
trial records before the court, the Fourth Circuit determined that Burket
failed to establish his claim that trial counsel performed under a conflict of
interest."' Although the Fourth Circuit did not apply Anderson as an
independent and adequate state procedural ground, Burket failed in his
federal habeas petition to get into the record any evidence to support his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.49
C. The Strickland Test as Applied to Guilty Pleas
Burket claimed that because his counsel was ineffective, his guilty pleas
were not made knowingly and voluntarily.' The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia dismissed this claim under the authority of Anderson."' The Supreme
Court of Virginia also dismissed the claim under the authority of Slayton v.
Parrigan.s2 Slayton held that claims that could have been raised at trial or
40. Burket, 208 F.3d at 184 (citing U.S. v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370,375 (4th Cir. 1991)); see
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
41. Burket, 208 F.3d at 184.
42. Id. at 184-85.







50. Id. at 188.
51. Id.; see Anderson, 281 S.E.2d at 888. As discussed in Part A supra, the Fourth
Circuit declined to apply the Anderson rule as an adequate and independent state procedural
ground for the purposes of procedural default. Burket, 208 F.3d at 188.
52. See Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1974).
[Vol. 13:1
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on direct appeal but were not, are not cognizable on state habeas."3 While
the Fourth Circuit did not consider Anderson an independent and adequate
state ground, the Slayton rule is an adequate and independent state ground
for the purposes of procedural default.' Under the doctrine of procedural
default, a federal court on habeas may not review constitutional claims if a
state court has declined to consider the merits on the basis of an adequate
and independent state procedural rule.5 Because Slayton is an adequate and
independent state ground, this claim was procedurally defaulted and the
Fourth Circuit was limited to the consideration of whether cause and
prejudice existed to excuse the procedural default and whether the state
court correctly applied its own rule.'
In the context of a guilty plea, the Strickland test for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel is whether counsel's performance fell below the objective
standard of reasonableness and "that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.""' Deference is given to trial counsel's actions, and
the presumption is that counsel's performance is objectively reasonable. 8
The standard is not one of hindsight, "but instead whether counsel at the
time acted within the liberal bounds of competent representation." 9 As
with Burket's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict
of interest, the court refused to consider petitioner's affidavits. The Fourth
Circuit's review of the evidence was limited to the trial record.' Based on
the trial court's extensive plea colloquy with Burket and the court's collo-
quy with trial counsel, the trial court determined that Burket's pleas of
guilty were made "knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily."61 The
Fourth Circuit concluded on the basis of overwhelming evidence of
Burket's guilt that trial counsel's performance was objectively reasonable.62
In light of the evidence against Burket, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
53. Burket, 208 F.3d at 189 (citing Slayton, 205 S.E.2d at 682).
54. Id. at 188-89.
55. Id. at 189.
56. Id. at 189; see also Harris, 489 U.S. at 262 (holding that a federal court cannot
question a state court's application of a state procedural rule if the state court's finding of
procedural default is based on an adequate and independent state ground).
57. Burket, 208 F.3d at 189 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 190.
60. Id.
61. Id. The standard for the constitutional validity of guilty pleas comes from North
Carolina v. Alford. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (holding that a guilty
plea must be the product of a free and intelligent choice). In applying the standard, the
defendant's plea is given a presumption of truthfulness. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637,
647 (1976) (plurality opinion).
62. Burket, 208 F.3d at 190.
2000]
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counsel's failure to raise the issue of the voluntariness of Burket's pleas did
not fall outside of the objectively reasonable standard of performance. The
court found that Burket failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strick-
land test as well.63 The court concluded that, in the face of "the Common-
wealth's powerful evidence," a reasonable defendant would not have insisted
on going to trial.6' The court found no cause or prejudice existed to excuse
the procedural default.65
IV Conclusion
Burket's case demonstrates the difficulty in making a successful claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the Fourth Circuit was
willing to address the merits of Burket's claims that were procedurally
defaulted in state habeas under Anderson, Burket's unsigned affidavit and
hearsay affidavit were insufficient support for his habeas claims. The
presumption of reasonableness of trial counsel's performance will not be
overcome by this type of evidence. If the court cannot properly consider
the evidence, the facts alleged in the inadmissible evidence will not persuade
the court when considering the claim on the merits or when the court




64. Id at 190-91.
65. Id. at 191.
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